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I. Introduction 
India is poised as one of the most important economies of the century. As China 
rises to be a more prevalent force in the Asian neighborhood, India is the only 
comparable state in size and growth that could potentially act as a counter-balance. With 
so much focus on India’s large economic growth, how have so few people recognized the 
large gap in growth rates between Indian states? And how have even fewer questioned 
the cause of this disparity? The country is one of the largest economies in the world and, 
since practicing more open-market policies starting in the early 1990s, has been known as 
one of the fastest growing economies as well. The measures taken to liberalize the 
market, which included industrial deregulation, privatization of state-owned enterprises, 
and reduced controls on foreign trade and investment, acted as catalysts to quicken the 
country's growth, which averaged about 7% per year from 1997 to 2011 compared to 
world average growth of between 3%-5% during the same time period. However, while it 
can be agreed upon that India has seen a vast amount of growth over the past two 
decades, what is not immediately obvious is the large amount of disparity of economic 
growth between the states of India.  Some states see growth rates well below the 7% 
average, while others see growth well above that rate. For example, Gujarat is one of the 
richest Indian states, compared to Bihar, which is one of the poorest. With relatively 
similar annual GDP growth, the gap between the two states is not closing in the areas of 
percent of output or GDP per capita (Nagaraj et al., 2013). The question that must be 
researched is what is responsible for causing numbers that in many cases would be 
considered to be relatively extreme? It is a bit of a conundrum. India has many challenges 
that must be addressed, including an inefficient power generation and distribution system, 
and high spending and poorly targeted subsidies. How is it that Indian states that 
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seemingly have similar advantages can perform so differently? The hypothesis for this 
question is that policies put in place after India’s independence from Britain in 1947 led 
to some states being currently tied up in bureaucracy and red tape, while others are 
perfectly placed to take part in the free market. This hypothesis will be studied as a two-
part question; (1) Did certain factors such a national and state politics or state national 
resources have an effect on the level of support for industrialization from the central 
government to the states, (2) Did support to the states cause a larger number of state 
enterprises in the time before reform, with a negative effect on GDP Per Capita in the 
present? 
After gaining liberalization from Britain in 1947, India began to follow the policy 
of the Permit Raj, which was an intricate system of licenses, regulations and red tape that 
were required to set up industry in India between 1947 and 1990. The policy was the 
result of India’s decision to have a planned economy with heavy government control on 
industry through which GDP grew at about 3.63%. During this time the Indian economy 
had widespread regulation, protectionism, and state ownership of large monopolies. 
After independence, the government of India started on the implementation of 
several ambitious projects of large infrastructure and development initiatives called “Five 
Year Plans.” The plans were to be a replication of the Soviet Union’s model of economic 
development. The focus was on industries in sectors such as power generation, iron and 
steel, machine tools, locomotives and automobiles and to move forward with rapid 
realization of goals by developing large state owned enterprises. This model focused on 
developing heavy industries through State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in states that had 
easy access to natural resources, such as hydroelectric power, iron ore, and coal. States 
	   6	  
that were comparatively lacking in the natural resources necessary for such industries 
were relatively neglected in participation in planned economic development. 
In 1991, the Indian government was facing rising deficits. This was a result of 
high oil prices and an inadequate level of exports. By this time India’s deficit had risen 
above 3% of its GDP. India went to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for 
assistance, which was granted, but only under the conditions of the “Washington 
Consensus” policies. These policies required significant economic reforms on the part of 
India. Washington Consensus set forth ten policies for market reform: fiscal discipline, 
increased public expenditure on health and education, tax reform, interest rate 
liberalization, a competitive exchange rate, the removal of barriers to trade and barriers to 
foreign investment, privatization, deregulation, and secure property. These were what 
would be progressively required of India. Subsidies were restricted and tariffs were 
lowered. The 40% cap on foreign ownership was removed and this allowed for more 
foreign directed investment (FDI). The focus of my research will be how this policy 
affected individual Indian states comparing the outcome for economic growth and the 
infrastructure that was already in place both regulatory and socially. 
After being liberated from Britain, the Indian policy of industrializing through 
state owned enterprises (SOEs) distorted incentives and inhibited free enterprise. The 
complex system of licensing procedures created delays, prohibitions and barriers to entry 
for natural entrepreneurship. When the Indian economy was liberalized in 1991, the 
poorer states that had been under-industrialized were in the right position to take 
advantage of the opportunities of the now relatively free market. The regions that had 
been made use of within the plans for industry with a high number of SOEs were 
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inhibited by convoluted bureaucracy and fell behind. Since the liberalization of the Indian 
economy, there has been a resulting “divergence of fortune” among the Indian states. 
Some states have a rapidly growing GDP while others face a more sluggish outlook and 
there has been great variation in the growth performance of the states. States generally 
fall into one of two categories: forward or backward. Forward states have higher levels of 
per capita income, better infrastructure, higher per capita resource flows, private 
investment, and better social and demographic indicators, while the backward states do 
not. Although they faced what would be considered a comparatively worse off starting 
point at the time the liberalization of the market, poorer states do not necessarily lag 
behind economically. Richer states experienced a degree of convergence during the post-
reform period while the poorer states did not. 
The hypothesis is based on market-based economies experiencing better 
economic performance than economies with high levels of government-sponsored 
industry. The objective is to study the relationship between government involvement, and 
the impact of these factors on economic growth. The objective in this project is to 
carefully examine this hypothesis by using detailed data from India. The goal of this 
research paper is to determine if there is a correlation between state resources or party 
affiliation and the outlay from the central government and also to determine if there is a 
correlation between government outlay and the eventual number of state enterprises and 
in turn if those state enterprises had an effect on the current GDP Per Capita. 
The next section will cover comparable theories for this disparity such as the 
geographical and reversal of fortune hypotheses. The following will address the data and 
the steps taken determining the validity of the proposed hypothesis after which the next 
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section will report the results. The last section will further elaborate upon the results 
discussing potential further research. 
 
II.  Methodologies from previous studies 
Although there has been little study into the disparities of economic progress in 
Indian states there has been comparable study into the role of institutions in growth. One 
study, done by Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, is a proponent for the idea of the “Big 
Push” in which simultaneous industrialization of many sectors of the economy can be 
profitable overall even when no individual sector can be successful in industrializing 
alone. This idea is presented through a model demonstrating firms producing different 
products investing and expanding production simultaneously, allowing them to all sell of 
their output to each other's workers and making them able to afford to pay a wage 
premium and still break even. (Murphy et al., 1988) This model shows two equilibria, 
one with and one without industrialization. In the case of India, this would mean that 
successful states grew in one big push allowing for one industry to prop up another, while 
those that are unsuccessful are so because of the moderate approach. The study continues 
to demonstrate other such models with the common feature of complementarities 
between industrializing sectors. In a study done by Sachs, Bajpai, and Ramiah, the 
purpose is to explain the growth experiences of 14 major states of India between 1980 
and 1998 by examining whether per capita incomes in the states have been converging or 
diverging. (Sachs et al., 2002) The study concludes that richer states experienced a degree 
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of convergence during the post-reform period, while the poorer states did not and were 
more likely to show divergence.  
The Reversal of Fortune Study (Acemoglu et al., 2002) looks into areas such as 
the correlation between urbanization and population density with economic growth. 
Acemoglu investigated the link between urbanization and income using cross-sectional 
regressions, studying urbanization and income per capita from 1750 to 1913 of income 
per capita on urbanization regressions. The Reversal of Fortune also studies the 
geography hypothesis claims that differences in economic performance reflect 
differences in geographic, climatic, and ecological characteristics across countries. 
Acemoglu investigated the link between urbanization and income using cross-sectional 
regressions, studying urbanization and income per capita from 1750 to 1913 of income 
per capita on urbanization regressions. This is found to not have a substantial effect on 
performance. The study that I am proposing has the added value of following the trail of 
assumptions. The Indian government assumed that it would be able to make great 
progress by supporting economic development in areas with more geographic and 
ecological resources. My study will determine the effect of this assumption in the long 
run, after the state has stopped regulating the market. 
The main hypothesis of the study is that societies that are prosperous today will 
stay prosperous because of the organization of the society. The belief is that a cluster of 
institutions that ensure property rights are necessary for economic growth. If a major 
shock, like colonialism disrupts the institutions of that society and establishes extractive 
institutions it will result in a reversal of fortune. While this can account for the broad 
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question of why some societies do better than others, it does not address how states 
within the same society can differ in economic growth so much. 
This study follows the trail of assumption. The Indian government assumed that it 
would be able to make great progress by supporting economic development in areas with 
more geographic and ecological resources. This paper studied the effect of this 
assumption in the long run, after the government has stopped regulating the market. 
As a starting point, the 15 states chosen were those from the Ghosh study 
covering the period 1960/61–2006/07, and evaluating economic performance in Andhra 
Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. 
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It examines regional divergence in per capita income during the pre- and post- 
reform periods, doing a regional analysis. In this study, Ghosh establishes that there are 
large variations in the growth performance of the states. Some states are growing faster 
than the economy, while others have growth rates that are slower than the national 
average. Ghosh tested for convergence of the states’ per capita incomes empirically by 
estimating cross-sectional regression of the annual growth rate of per capita income on 
the initial level of per capita income. The results suggest that the ongoing economic 
reforms have heightened state disparity in per capita income. The states with higher 
initial levels of per capita income grew faster than those with lower initial levels during 
the post-reform period. (Ghosh, 2012) 
Source: Registrar General and Census Commissioner (2001).	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III. Data and Methodology 
For this study, the population data employed was retrieved from the 1951, 1961, 
1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, and 2011 Indian Census. The data for the industrial resources, 
state public sector undertakings, GDP per capita, and outlay of funding from the central 
government has been retrieved from the 12 five-year plans and other reports from the 
Indian Planning Commission.  
To determine the role of policy, it must be determined if factors such as political 
affiliation, mineral resources, and population has a role in where the central government 
would allocate during the initial planning stages and if the initial outlay of central support 
has an effect on current GDP per capita. 
 
State Party 
Similarity 
Resources 
1956 
Outlay 
(R.cr) 
Population 1956 GDP Per 
Capita 2010 
ANDHRA PRADESH 1 0 119 31115000 2726.449 
ASSAM 1 1 57.9 8029000 1015.53 
BIHAR 1 2 194.2 29085000 931.2154 
KARNATAKA 1 1 80.6 19402000 3757.606 
KERALA 0 0 72 13549000 2757.771 
MADYA PRADESH 1 3 123.7 18615000 5385.852 
MAHARASHTRA 1 3 266.2 32003000 1279.264 
ORISSA 1 3 100 14646000 3837.468 
PUNJAB 1 0 126.3 9161000 1171.047 
RAJASTHAN 1 1 97.4 15971000 3539.051 
TAMIL NADU 1 2 173.1 30119000 1908.69 
UTTAR PRADESH 1 1 253.1 60274000 2990.707 
WEST BENGAL 1 3 153.7 26300000 1074.065 
 
Table 1 
State party similarity with state governments that have been aligned with the national government for three 
years or more, showing 1, and if less than three years showing 0. The number of resources show if the state 
has iron ore, coal, or zinc; 0 if it has none, 1 if it has one, 2 if two of the resources are present, and 3 if 
three are present. The outlay is the amount of funding from the central government to the state.	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For the data in Table 1, Party Similarity shows the correspondence between the 
national and the state party. If both the national and state party have been aligned for 3 or 
more years it is depicted as a dummy variable of 1. If the national and state parties are not 
aligned or have been aligned for less than three years it is depicted as 0. The Resources 
category refers to three main resources considered by the Planning Commission 
according to the first three five-year plans: iron ore, coal, and zinc. The number shown 
refers to the number of resources the state was known to have at the time of initial 
planning (i.e. Bihar was known to have two out of three of the desired resources). The 
data for Table 1 is pulled from the second five-year plan in 1956. 
The data compiled was also used to determine if there is a relationship between 
state resources identified in the initial planning periods and the number of public sector 
undertakings (PSUs) within each individual state by the time the start of the reform 
period, or between party similarity in 1956 and PSUs, as well as the relationship between 
the number of PSUs and GDP per capita in 2010. 
 
 
State Coal iron 
ore 
zinc Total PSUs GDP Per 
Capita 2010 
Party Similarity 
1956 
ANDHRA PRADESH 0 0 0 0 40 2726.449 1 
ASSAM 1 0 0 1 42 1015.53 1 
BIHAR 1 1 0 2  931.2154 1 
GUJARAT 0 0 1 1 37 1251.18  
HARYANA 0 0 0 0 22 1515.46  
KARNATAKA 0 1 0 1 78 3757.606 1 
Table 2 
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KERALA 0 0 0 0 102 2757.771 0 
MADYA PRADESH 1 1 1 3 18 5385.852 1 
MAHARASHTRA 1 1 1 3 48 1279.264 1 
ORISSA 1 1 1 3 27 3837.468 1 
PUNJAB 0 0 0 0 24 1171.047 1 
RAJASTHAN 0 0 1 1 22 3539.051 1 
TAMIL NADU 1 1 0 2 67 1908.69 1 
UTTAR PRADESH 0 0 1 1 50 2990.707 1 
WEST BENGAL 1 1 1 3 49 1074.065 1 
 
 
 
The data in Table 2 was retrieved from Indian Planning Commission reports and 
the World Statesmen Encyclopedia. It depicts the states’ resource allocation as well as 
their number of PSUs, GDP Per Capita in 2010, and party alignment between the central 
government and states. 
For this study, it is prudent to first consider if there is a correlation between 
political similarity and central government outlay to each state, the availability of the 
resources determined in the initial planning and government outlay, and the population of 
each state. It is necessary to consider if the outlay from the government was used to 
determine if each factor individually had any effect on how much the planning 
commission chose to allocate for industry development. Next it must be determined if 
there is a correlation between the Commission’s plans for outlay during the initial five-
year plans and current GDP Per Capita as a means to establish if government planning 
and intervention has had long term effect on GDP Per Capita. Using the data from Table 
2, it is also necessary to determine if there is a correlation between the number of 
Party similarity with state governments that have been aligned with the national government for three years 
or more, showing 1, and if less than three years showing 0. The Total number of resources show if the state 
has iron ore, coal, or zinc; 0 if it has none, 1 if it has one, 2 if two of the resources are present, and 3 if 
three are present. PSUs shows the number public sector undertakings during the time period from 1985-
1993.	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resources within each state during the initial planning stages and the number of PSUs 
established during the time before market reform and in turn check for a correlation 
between the number of PSUs at the time of financial reform and current GDP Per Capita 
for each state. 
Because all states did not start with the same GDP Per Capita, it is necessary to 
control for their GDP Per Capita at the onset of state planning. And so a regression is 
used to determine if there is a correlation when previous GDP Per Capita is taken in 
consideration. A regression is also used to determine if there is a correlation between the 
initial government outlay and current GDP Per Capita when controlling for initial GDP 
Per Capita. 
 
IV. Results 
The hypothesis of this study is in two parts. The first part is based on the idea that 
during the initial planning stages of the Indian Planning Commission; states were 
categorized into groups that would determine the amount of central government support 
for industrialization moving forward. Based on the planning documents it can be 
determined that specific states were earmarked for higher amounts of funding from the 
onset decided by a range of variables (1st Five Year Plan.) In this particular study, the 
variables examined are the relationship between state and national party, the presence of 
a few key industrial resources, and population. 
The second part of the hypothesis, addresses the assumption that a higher outlay 
from the central government led to a higher level of state intervention in the market by 
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way of PSUs, which in turn led to a stunted economy in the present. Previous studies 
have touched on this hypothesis as an explanation for the divergence within the Indian 
economy. 
For the data from Table 1 there is a very small correlation between government 
outlay and party similarity as well as between government outlay and resources, showing 
that alignment between the national controlling party and the state controlling party did 
not play a significant role in how much the central government would allocate to the 
states for economic development. Neither did the presence of resources crucial to 
development within a state play a large role in how much funding a state would receive. 
There is a large correlation between the population of a state and the amount of planning 
funds allocated to each state. With a correlation number of (-0.293) there is only a small 
correlation between initial central outlay and current state GDP Per Capita. With that it 
can be determined that variable such as population played a larger role in determining 
how large an allocation a state would receive than a similarity of policy or the resources 
available. 
 
 
 Party 
Similarity 
Resources Population GDP Per Capita 
Correlation 0.30897 0.37844 0.80393 -0.29346 
 
 
Correlation between Party Similarity, Resources, Population and 
GDP Per Capita to Outlay 
	   17	  
With the data from Table 2, there is almost no correlation between the resources 
within each state during the initial planning period and the number of PSUs present by 
the start of market reform, nor is there correlation between the number the number of 
PSUs during the beginning of economic reform and present GDP Per Capita. There is a 
surprising negative correlation between Party Similarity at the start of planning and the 
number of PSUs at the start of the 90s, meaning that when the national and state parties 
were aligned, there were fewer establishments of PSUs within those states. 
 
 
 Resources GDP Per Capita Party Similarity 1956 
Correlation -0.15933 -0.06184 -0.69000 
 
Because starting economic status is an important factor in future GDP Per Capita, 
it was necessary to control for GDP at a point previous to market reform. When 
controlled for an earlier GDP Per Capita in 1970, the correlation between current GDP 
Per Capita in 2010 and the initial five-year plan outlay changes from a low negative (-
0.293) to a high positive (0.610) meaning that when controlling for the starting GDP Per 
Capita of the states, the higher the outlay from the central government, the higher the 
GDP Per Capita. 
     
 
     Regression Statistics 
    Multiple R 0.61002 
    R Square 0.372125 
    Adjusted R Square 0.257966 
    
Correlation between Resources, Party Similarity, and GDP Per 
Capita to Number of PSUs 
Controlled	  Correlation	  between	  Party	  Similarity	  and	  Resources	  with	  Outlay	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Standard Error 1156.835 
    Observations 14 
    
      ANOVA 
     
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
Regression 2 8724709 4362354 3.259705 0.077322 
Residual 11 14720933 1338267 
  Total 13 23445642       
        Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value  
Intercept -306.953 1367.513 -0.22446 0.826513  
X Variable 1 -0.68604 3.120787 -0.21983 0.830032  
X Variable 2 4.684042 1.836398 2.550668 0.026963  
 
With regards to the correlation between the number of PSUs at the start of market 
reform and the current GDP per capita (2010) , when controlled for the earlier GDP Per 
Capita (1970), there is a high correlation between the number of PSUs and the current 
GDP Per Capita, meaning that the more PSUs in the state at the start of the reform the 
higher the current GDP Per Capita. This outcome is opposite of the hypothesis that more 
government involvement by way of these state enterprises played a part in stunting the 
economic growth of the involved states. 
 
 
Regression Statistics 
    Multiple R 0.866109 
    R Square 0.750144 
    Adjusted R 
Square 0.700173 
    Standard Error 721.0427 
    Observations 13 
    
      ANOVA 
     
Controlled	  Correlation	  between	  Outlay	  and	  PSUs	  with	  2010	  GDP	  Per	  Capita	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  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
Regression 2 15609072 7804536 15.01153 0.000974 
Residual 10 5199026 519902.6 
  Total 12 20808098       
      
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value  
Intercept -2398.14 978.9326 -2.44975 0.034272  
X Variable 1 36.90144 8.73419 4.224941 0.001758  
X Variable 2 5.083876 1.248705 4.071319 0.002245  
      
      
      
V. Discussion 
The hypothesis that resources and party affiliation would be shown to have an 
effect on the considerations of the planning commission when determining the central 
government funding for industry development during the initial planning stages was not 
proven to be true, nor was the continuation of the hypothesis that state intervention by 
way of funding for industry development and the creation of public sector undertakings 
would have a negative effect on the long-term economic growth of individual states. 
There are multiple reasons for these outcomes. For the first part of this hypothesis 
a more in-depth look at data taking a year-by-year look at outlay and political affiliation 
beyond the general look at length of time for political party alignment between state and 
national governments. A look at the year-by-year outlay for development from the central 
government could yield a different outcome. Taking a closer look beyond just the 
presence of particular resources within states and instead including a wider range of 
resources beyond the top three particulars listed within the planning documents, as well 
as including the actual amount and breadth of these resources within each state to give a 
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better picture of the range of availability for particular industries by potential of what 
resources already existed within the state could also tell a different, more complete story. 
Within the present outcomes, there is no relationship between the amount of resources 
and the amount support from the central government. In the documents for the first five-
year plan, states were sectioned by outlay into three categories of A, B, and C. 
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 States categorized by future outlay during the first five-year plan. 1951 
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The low level of correlation shows that these groupings were not as politically 
motivated nor resource based as hypothesized. 
For the second part of the hypothesis addressing the long-term effects of PSUs on 
GDP Per Capita, the survey done by the Planning Commission only had a 50% 
participation rate, which could have potentially skewed the results. The thought behind 
the hypothesis was that states that received more funding would have a higher level of 
planned implementation of industry building through PSUs which would in turn leave 
behind a more bureaucratic and red-tape-laden system after the start of the reform period 
hindering the long-term growth of the state economies. The data collected showed this to 
not be true. There is potential that a closer study of more specific PSUs might uncover a 
negative correlation between certain types of PSUs and GDP Per Capita or that a more 
comprehensive set of data might show a correlation in the opposite direction or no 
correlation at all. 
Overall, there is insufficient evidence from this study to suggest that state 
resources or political alignment had an effect on the support for industry building during 
the planning period. There is also no sufficient evidence to suggest that establishment of 
state PSUs had a negative effect on freedom economic growth. 
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